Many problems in finance and economics involve stopping decisions. Individuals decide when to sell an asset, when to invest in some project, or when to stop gambling in a casino. We provide a general result on the stopping behavior of a prospect theory agent who is naïve, i.e., unaware of his time-inconsistency. If a market offers a sufficiently rich set of investment strategies and, in particular, if it is complete, then the agent never stops. This extreme result applies to a very general specification of prospect theory and to a very general class of discrete and continuous, finite or infinite time stochastic processes. The dynamic result is a consequence of a static result that we call skewness preference in the small: At any wealth level there exists a right-skewed, arbitrarily small gamble that a prospect theory agent wants to take, even if it has negative expectation. In particular, this formally proves that prospect theory agents are not risk-averse, not over losses and not over gains.
INTRODUCTION
While expected utility theory (EUT, Bernoulli 1738 /1954 , von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944 is the leading normative theory of decision making under risk, cumulative prospect theory (CPT, Tversky 1979, Tversky and Kahneman 1992 ) is the most prominent positive theory. EUT is well-studied in both static and dynamic settings, ranging from game theory over investment problems to institutional economics. In contrast, for CPT most research so far has focused on the static case. This paper derives a fundamental result on the gambling and investment behavior that CPT predicts in a dynamic context. This result has immediate and strong consequences for a number of dynamic decision problems such as irreversible investment, casino gambling, or the disposition effect. Usually, CPT is characterized by four features: First, outcomes are evaluated by a utility function relative to a reference point which separates all outcomes into gains and losses. Second, utility is S-shaped, i.e., convex for losses and concave for gains. Third, probabilities are distorted by inverse-S-shaped probability weighting functions (one for gains and one for losses). This implies that the probabilities of unlikely and extreme events are overweighted. Fourth, losses loom larger than gains, which is referred to as loss aversion. A small amount of probability weighting is the single driving source for this paper's results. "Small" is relative to the amount of loss aversion and will be defined precisely. Notably, we employ only a few mild and natural assumptions on the curvatures of the value and weighting functions. The reference point may be arbitrary and change over time. If some probability weighting is considered to be a fundamental element of prospect theory, then so are the results in this paper. Our dynamic results can be traced back to a seemingly innocuous result that we call skewness preference in the small. At any wealth level, a CPT agent wants to take a sufficiently right-skewed binary risk which is arbitrarily small, even if it has negative expectation. We call such a risk attractive to the CPT agent. Therefore, a CPT agent can always be lured into gambling by offering an attractive risk. We show that such a risk may be small. However, depending on the value function, the risk may in fact be quite large. For the original parametrization of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) we show that there exists an attractive risk of any size-also with possibly negative expectation. A theory-free definition of risk aversion (risk seeking) at wealth level x is that any zero-mean risk is unattractive (attractive) to the agent. Therefore, skewness preference in the small implies that a CPT agent is not risk averse at any wealth level, and a symmetric result says that CPT is also risk seeking nowhere. We are not aware of a formal proof of this result, not even for the original version of CPT by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) . In particular, our result implies that a small amount probability weighting eventually dominates any curvature effects on risk aversion that concave and convex parts of the value function may have: CPT does never imply risk aversion over gains and risk seeking over losses. Our main result is a theorem on the dynamic gambling (or investment) behavior of a prospect theory agent who is naïve, i.e., unaware of his time-inconsistency. For a very large class of gambles, CPT agents never stop gambling. Intuitively, at any point in time the agent thinks "If I lose just a little bit more, I will stop. And if I gain, I will continue". We show that such a stop-loss strategy results in a right-skewed gambling experience which is attractive because of our static result: skewness preference in the small. However, since the agent is time-inconsistent, once a loss has occurred, a new attractive skewed gambling strategy will come to his mind and thus he will continue gambling. Formally, we derive a stopping theorem for prospect theory agents which holds for a large class of stochastic processes that model the gambling or investment opportunities. These processes include geometric Brownian motion (which is the most common choice to model the price development of an asset) as well as arithmetic Brownian motion which could, for example, model the accumulated gains of an agent gambling in a casino. Notably, the process may have arbitrary drift, and thus the result also holds for highly unfavorable gambles with a large negative drift. Because of its generality, the result has implications for numerous prominent economic decision problems. We first present an analytical solution to a continuous time, infinite horizon casino gambling model in the spirit of Barberis (2012) . We show that naive CPT agents gamble in a casino until the bitter end, i.e., will go bankrupt almost surely. We show that this extreme result is robust to finite and/ or discrete time spaces, as long as the stochastic process allows for a rich set of possible gambling strategies. In complete markets, for example, our result will hold irrespective of the time space. We then investigate the irreversible investment problem of Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for a naive CPT investor. More generally than that we show that CPT agents will never exercise an American option even if it is profitable to do so in the first place. Finally, our results imply that CPT cannot predict the disposition effect (Shefrin and Statman 1985) for naive investors. This is especially striking as Henderson (forthcoming) shows that, in a model without probability distortion, prospect theory can explain the disposition effect. In Section 2 we will define our general version of CPT. In Section 3 we present our static result that CPT implies skewness preference in the small, and point out several implications. Section 4 presents the "never stopping" result. Section 5 discusses the implications for CPT models of casino gambling, real-option investment behavior, and the disposition effect. Section 6 discusses the robustness of our result towards discrete and finite time spaces. Section 7 discusses our results and assumptions as well as venues for future research. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
PROSPECT THEORY PREFERENCES
We consider an agent with CPT preferences over real-valued random variables X. For simplicity, first consider a binary risk L (p, b, a) that yields outcome b with probability p ∈ (0, 1), and a < b otherwise. A prospect theory agent evaluates binary risks as
with non-decreasing weighting functions w − , w
0) = 0 and w + (1) = w − (1) = 1 and a value function U : R → R that satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2 stated below. Later on we will adopt the general version of CPT axiomatized recently by Kothiyal et al. (2011) which also applies to random variables X with possibly continuous outcomes
It is important to note that for binary risks this formula reduces to formula (1), and for general discrete prospects it reduces to the well-known form of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) . To understand the results of this paper it is sufficient to have formula (1) in mind.
Assumption 1 (Value function) The value function is absolutely continuous
1 and strictly increasing with U (r) = 0 for some r ∈ R. Further, λ = sup x∈R
< ∞ exists, where ∂ − U (x) and ∂ + U (x) denote the left and right derivative of U, respectively. r is called reference point, and CPT preferences are defined on changes in wealth relative to r rather than on absolute wealth levels. Typical choices for r are the status quo of current wealth or some other benchmark. For example, when investing in a risky asset, r could be the return of a risk-free investment. Realizations x of X with x < r are referred to as losses, and realizations x ≥ r are called gains. Our results hold for any r ∈ R. In other words, the choice of r is immaterial to our findings. In many specifications of prospect theory, the additional assumption is made that U is differentiable everywhere except at the reference point such that λ =
. It is further assumed that λ > 1 and that the reflection property
holds for some function u : R + → R + , where U (r) = 0 implies that u(0) = 0. λ > 1 then implies that losses loom larger than gains to the CPT agent; see Köbberling and Wakker (2005) for an analysis of the loss aversion index
. We allow for non-differentiable utility which encompasses the evaluation of assets with non-differentiable payoffs such as option contracts. The original choice for u by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) 
Note that if w + and w − are differentiable at 0 and 1, then the conditions in Assumption 2 simplify to w + ′ (0) > λ and w − ′ (1) > λ. If these derivatives do not exist because they approach infinity, the limit superior is infinite which is also consistent with Assumption 2. We do not require the weighting functions to be inverse-S-shaped, i.e., to start out concave and to turn convex at some point. Our assumption is weaker and much more in the spirit of Wakker and Tversky (1995) , who define a connected likelihood insensitivity region bounded away from both 0 and 1. Actually, here we only require overweighting of small probabilities when associated with large outcomes; see Wakker (2010, pp. 222-233) for a comprehensive discussion of likelihood insensitivity and inverse-S-shape.
Observation 1 Assumption 2 is satisfied by the commonly used weighting functions of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) , Prelec (1998) , and the neoadditive weighting function. Whether the weighting function of Rieger and Wang (2006) suffices Assumption 2 depends on parameter choices. Rieger and Wang (2006) farsightedly proposed a weighting function with finite derivatives at 0 and 1 in order to ensure non-occurrence of the St. Petersburg paradox under CPT. However, such a version of CPT still succumbs to our results when the derivatives are finite and larger than λ. If one indeed restricts to very little probability weighting (1 < w + ′ (0), w − ′ (1) < λ), CPT may lose much of its predictive power. As an illustrative example, Pfiffelmann (2011) shows that CPT with little probability weighting can no longer explain the celebrated coexistence of gambling and insurance. Finally, many of our results allow to relax Assumption 2 so that they apply to any weighting function with derivatives at 0 and 1 strictly larger than 1, which corresponds to a minimal departure from EUT's linear processing of probabilities. In the following, our sole assumptions on the CPT preference functional (2) are Assumptions 1 and 2. Our point is that a small amount of probability weighting alone is sufficient for a fundamental property of CPT in the static case, which in turn has drastic implications for CPT in a dynamic setting.
STATIC RESULTS

Prospect Theory's Skewness Preference in the Small
This paper starts out with a seemingly innocuous result on prospect theory preferences and small, skewed risks. We say that a risk is attractive or that an agent wants to take a risk if the CPT utility of current wealth plus the risk is strictly higher than the CPT utility of current wealth. By a means of a continuity argument we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1 (Unfair Attractive Gambles) For every wealth level x ∈ R there exists an attractive, arbitrarily small binary lottery with negative mean.
It is straightforward to formulate a local version of Theorem 1.
Corollary 2 (Local Result) At some given wealth level x there exists an attractive, arbitrarily small zero-mean binary lottery even if Assumption 2 is relaxed by replacing
. If U is differentiable at x, then Assumption 2 may be further relaxed by replacing λ with 1.
The intuition of the proof of Theorem 1 is that CPT implies skewness preference. Ebert (2011) illustrates that, for binary lotteries, skewness-according to both the tails and moments definitions-is exhaustively captured in the probability parameter. Therefore, we can interpret the proof of Theorem 1 as the construction of a sufficiently right-skewed fair lottery. By letting p go to zero, the binary lottery becomes more and more right-skewed. At some point the lottery is so much skewed that a CPT agent wants to take it. Skewness preference has been of major interest in the recent economics and finance literature. Numerous empirical and experimental papers find support for skewness preference, e.g., Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) and Boyer et al. (2010) for asset returns, Golec and Tamarkin (1998) for horse-race bets, and Ebert and Wiesen (2011) in a laboratory experiment. Many behavioral traits can be traced back to skewness preference (notably, the coexistence of gambling and insurance), as well as various financial phenomena. An example are positive expected first-day returns accompanied by negative medium-run expected returns for initial public offerings (Green and Hwang, forthcoming) . In many of these situations, prospect theory may do such a good job in explaining behavior because, through its probability weighting component, it implies skewness preference. Other papers have argued like this. To best of our knowledge, however, Theorem 1 is the first rigorous result that relates CPT to skewness preference. In particular, skewness preference is so strong that it prevents an unambiguous statement on risk attitudes within CPT:
Prospect Theory Agents are Risk-Averse and Risk-Seeking Nowhere
A decision-theoretic implication of Theorem 1, which is of independent interest, is on how risk aversion manifests in CPT. A theory-free definition of risk aversion (risk-seeking) at wealth level x is that any zero-mean risk is unattractive (attractive) to the agent. Numerous qualitative statements on how the curvature of the value function affects risk aversion in CPT can be found in the literature, but formal results are hard to find.
3 Kahneman and Tversky (1979, p. 285) themselves noted that "[Our previous analysis] restricts risk seeking in the domain of gains and risk aversion in the domain of losses to small probabilities [...]" Here is a stronger and simple result derived from weaker assumptions, i.e., from some probability 3 Hong et al. (1987) and Chateauneuf and Cohen (1994) , respectively, characterize strong and weak risk aversion in rank-dependent utility (RDU), which is the special case of CPT with gains only. They assume a smooth value function to make use of Taylor expansions in their proofs. For general CPT, differentiability assumptions are restrictive because utility may have a kink at the reference point. Our proof does not require differentiability and is not restricted to rank-dependent utility. Schmidt and Zank (2008) characterize the curvatures of value and weighting function under which CPT exhibits strong risk aversion (aversion to mean preserving spreads).
weighting only.
Corollary 3 At any wealth level a CPT agent is not risk-averse.
As in the Corollary 2, Assumptions 1 and 2 may be relaxed to obtain a tighter result locally. It is straightforward to formulate analogous versions of Theorem 1 and its corollaries on the unattractiveness of left-skewed gambles and risk-seeking under CPT. To this means, we have to assume that probabilities associated with bad outcomes are overweighted. These assumptions 4 are complementary to our Assumptions 1 and 2, and are likewise fulfilled by the specifications in Observation 1. Then, everywhere, there exists an arbitrarily small, leftskewed binary risk which is unattractive. Therefore, a CPT agent is risk-seeking nowhere. We find it striking that just some probability weighting "dominates" the impact of the curvature of the value function. In particular, our result illustrates that the intuition that the S-shaped value function of prospect theory implies risk aversion for gains and risk-seeking for losses is misleading. No matter "how concave" the value function is, probability weighting always implies risk-seeking for some (skewed) risks.
Large Risks
Next, note that we may construct an attractive risk which is arbitrarily small. However, it must not be misunderstood that the attractive risk has to be small. Striking results on large attractive gambles are presented by Rieger and Wang (2006) who investigate the occurrence of the St. Petersburg Paradox under CPT, and by Azevedo and Gottlieb (2012) who show that risk-neutral firms can extract unbounded profits from CPT consumers. These authors construct attractive gambles that involve arbitrarily large payoffs, and thus it is intuitive that their results also require assumptions on the value function. Azevedo and Gottlieb (2012) point out that for the power value function and for any attractive binary gamble L the multiple cL (c > 1) is also attractive. In combination with our result this then implies that there exist attractive gambles of any size. This we will make precise in the next section. lim sup p→0
Evidently, these properties are also necessary for the famous inverse-S-shape, and consistent with the likelihood-insensitivity definition of Wakker and Tversky (1995) . Under these assumptions one can construct an unattractive, left-skewed binary risk. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1, with the main difference that one must let p → 1 rather than p → 0 to generate left-skew.
The Case of a S-Shaped Power Value Function
In this section we consider a power value function which satisfies the reflection property, equation (3).
Assumption 3 (S-Shaped Power Value Function) The value function is given by
with α ∈ (0, 1) andλ > 1.
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For this very choice, the Köbberling-Wakker index of loss aversion
is not well-defined (in particular, it is not equal toλ) because the power function has infinite derivative at 0. Therefore, Assumption 1 is not fulfilled, and thus Theorem 1 does not apply. However, we can state a similar result under a slightly different assumption on the weighting functions.
Assumption 4 The weighting functions w
+ and w − satisfy 1. lim sup p→0
Note that condition 1 in Assumption 4 is stronger than condition 1 of Assumption 2. However, it is weaker than the assumption in Azevedo and Gottlieb's Proposition 1 when applied to power utility, which requires that the limit is infinite. The limit is infinite for the weighting functions of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) under parameter restrictions that are typically fulfilled according to most empirical studies; see Azevedo and Gottlieb (2012) for an elaboration. For the weighting function of Rieger and Wang (2006) Power utility is differentiable everywhere except at the reference point. Therefore, note that Corollary 2, which assumes just minimal probability weighting, also applies to power utility whenever we are not at the reference point. Therefore, we need Assumption 4 exclusively to cover gambling at the reference point. Finally, let us combine Theorem 2 with the result of Azevedo and Gottlieb (2012) . 
ON PROSPECT THEORY IN A DYNAMIC CONTEXT
In this section we investigate the consequences of skewness preference in the small in a dynamic context. Assume that Assumptions 1 and 2 are fulfilled. Alternatively, assume the power utility case, i.e., Assumptions 3 and 4. We now define a stochastic process (X t ) t∈R + that could reflect the cumulated returns of an investment project, or the price development of an asset traded in the stock market. It could likewise model an agent's wealth when gambling in a casino. Let (W t ) t∈R + be a Brownian motion and (X t ) t∈R + a Markov diffusion that satisfies
where we assume µ : R → R and σ : R → (0, ∞) such that there exists a unique solution with continuous paths.
7 Note that the most frequently considered processes, arithmetic and geometric Brownian motion, are covered by this definition. 8 We denote by S the set of all stopping times such that the agent bases his stopping decision only on his past observations. Formally, all τ ∈ S are adapted to the natural filtration (F t ) t∈R + of the process (X t ) t∈R + . The prospect theory utility of a stopping strategy τ ∈ S given the information F t at time t 7 µ : R → R and σ : R → (0, ∞) are locally Lipschitz continuous Borel functions with linear growth, i.e., there exists a K > 0 such that |µ(x)| 2 + |σ(x)| 2 ≤ K(1 + |x| 2 ) . 8 In Appendix C we discuss discounting. In particular, for the geometric Brownian motion we show explicitly that also the discounted stochastic process satisfies our assumptions.
is given by
The agent stops at time t if and only if his prospect value CP T (X τ , F t ) of any stopping time τ ∈ S is less than or equal to what he gets if he stops immediately, which would be CP T (X t ). The probability weighting of prospect theory induces a time inconsistency (Machina 1989) . The interaction of probability weighting, time-inconsistency, and naïveté is well illustrated by Barberis (2012) along the lines of a casino gambling example, which we reconsider in the next section. A naïve agent does not anticipate that later she might deviate from her initial plan of gambling. Therefore, at every point in time, the naïve agent looks for a gambling strategy τ that brings her higher CPT utility than stopping immediately. If such a strategy exists, she continues to gamble-irrespective of her initial gambling plan. In the following, we always consider such a naïve agent.
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The following theorem presents a general result on the gambling or investment behavior of a naïve CPT agent with a continuous, infinite time horizon. In Section 5 we show that it has far-reaching implications by applying it to three selected dynamic decision problems. In Section 6 we explain why the result typically also applies in discrete and finite time. Keep in mind that the result is independent of the particular CPT specification, with only mild assumptions on the curvatures of the value and weighting functions, and independent of the reference point (which my change over time). It holds for the general class of stochastic processes specified above, in particular for processes with zero, positive, and negative drift.
Theorem 3 The naïve agent never stops.
The intuition of the proof is to construct a stop-loss strategy, i.e., one where the agent plans to stop if the process falls a little bit and plans to continue until it has risen significantly. This results in a right-skewed binary risk which the agent prefers to stopping immediately due to Theorem 1 or, in the case of a power value function, due to Theorem 2.
APPLICATIONS
Casino Gambling
Our first example is the continuous, infinite time horizon analogue to the discrete, finite time casino gambling model of Barberis (2012) . Barberis studies the behavior of prospect theory agents who gamble 50-50 bets in a casino for up to five periods. Because no analytical solution is available, Barberis (2012) investigates planned and actual behavior by computing the CPT values of all possible gambling strategies that can be generated by a finite 50-50 binomial tree, for more than 8000 parameter combinations of the CPT parametrization of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) . The reference point is constant and assumed to equal initial wealth when entering the casino. The simulation results show that, in this setting, naïve agents typically plan to follow a stop-loss strategy when entering the casino, but end up playing a gain-exit strategy (i.e., continue gambling when losing and stop gambling when winning). We now first give the analytical solution to the continuous, infinite time analogue of the casino gambling model, which follows immediately from Theorem 3. Let (X t ) t∈R + be an arithmetic Brownian motion with negative drift µ(x) = µ < 0 and constant variance σ(x) = σ > 0, i.e., dX t = µdt + σdW t .
Due to the negative drift the agent loses money in expectation if he does not stop. Further assume that the process absorbs at zero since then the agent goes bankrupt. From Theorem 3 it follows that the naïve agent gambles until the bitter end, i.e., he will not stop gambling unless he is forced to due to bankruptcy. From standard results in probability theory we know that this will happen almost surely, i.e., P(X τ = 0) = 1. We will compare this result to that of Barberis (2012) in Section 6.
Exercising an American Option
Let (X t ) t∈R + be a geometric Brownian motion with drift µ ∈ R and variance σ > 0, i.e.,
The agent holds an American option that pays
if exercised at time t where α > 0 denotes the risk-free rate. Here K ∈ R + represents the costs of investment. The American option could be interpreted as an investment opportunity, i.e., a real option (compare Dixit and Pindyck 1994). We assume µ < α to ensure that the value of the expected value maximizer is finite. The agent is allowed to exercise his option at every point in time t ≥ 0.
The payoff π(X t ) is incorporated into our prospect theory model by replacing the agent's value function U (X t ) byÛ (X t ) = U (π(X t )). Here we benefit from not having assumed differentiability of the value function at any wealth level. Since π(·) is non-differentiable at K,Û (·) will have a kink at K, in addition to a possible kink at the reference point r.
From Theorem 3 it follows that the agent will never exercise his option, i.e., τ = ∞. As lim t→∞ e −αt (X t − K) P − → 0 the naïve prospect theory agent gets a payoff of zero even though he could get a strictly positive payoff by exercising the option immediately whenever X 0 > K.
Prospect Theory Predicts no Disposition Effect for Naïve Investors
The disposition effect (Shefrin and Statman 1985) refers to individual investors being more inclined to sell stocks that have gained in value (winners) rather than stocks that have declined in value (losers). Numerous papers have addressed this phenomenon, and some of the most immediate explanations such as transaction costs, tax concerns, or portfolio rebalancing have been formidably ruled out by Odean (1998) . Several papers have investigated whether prospect theory can explain the disposition effect. However, all of them seem to have done so without the consideration of probability weighting (Barberis 2012, footnote 26) . Formal models (without probability weighting) have been put forward just recently by Kyle et al. (2006) , Kaustia (2010) , Barberis and Xiong (2009) , and Henderson (forthcoming). The results are mixed. Some find that prospect theory can predict the disposition effect, and others that it cannot, at least not under all relevant circumstances. Barberis (2012) notes that the binomial tree in his paper, which models a casino, may likewise represent the evolution of a stock price over time. Then, naïve investors may exhibit a disposition effect, even though they plan to do the opposite of the disposition effect. Our result can be related to the disposition effect in the same spirit. We have proven-rather than concluded from simulation studies-that, under just some probability weighting, naïve CPT agents will sell neither losers nor winners at any time. As a consequence, prospect theory with probability distortion does not predict a disposition effect for naïve investors. This is especially striking as Henderson (forthcoming) shows that, in an analogous model without probability distortion, prospect theory can explain the disposition effect. Note that the continuous time price processes such as geometric Brownian motion that are covered by our setup fit particularly well for financial market models. In any case, in the next section we show that our result applies to a wide range of continuous or discrete, finite or infinite time horizon processes.
ROBUSTNESS TO DISCRETE AND FINITE TIME SPECIFICATIONS
While it may seem that our results hinge upon the continuous time setup, they do not. Continuous time ensures that at every point in time the strategy set of the agent is sufficiently rich. To illustrate this point consider a binomial random walk (X t ) t∈N with jump size one and equal probability for up-and down movements. At every point in time t the agent can choose the stakesize s t ∈ [0, 1] (as a fraction of his wealth y t ) to bet. The evolution of his wealth is then given by
with initial wealth y 0 > 0. The following strategy (of choosing s t ) results in any given fair binary lottery L (p, b, a) . Choose s t maximal such that y t+1 ∈ [a, b], i.e., s t = max{s ∈ [0, 1] : (1 +s)y t ≥ a and (1 +s)y t ≤ b}
Due to the martingale property it follows from Doob's optional sampling theorem that the probabilities of hitting b and a that are induced by this strategy are fair, i.e., are p and 1 − p, respectively. Therefore, if L(p, b, a) is attractive according to either Theorem 1 or 2, then the agent will gamble. Since an attractive lottery exists at any wealth level (i.e., at any time t) the agent never stops. The crucial point of this example is that the time space may be discrete as long as the space of stopping strategies is sufficiently rich. Specifically, a global result like Theorem 3 requires that, at any time t, for any state X t , at least one stopping strategy is available that results in an attractive (skewed) gamble. This explains why the gambling behavior documented in Barberis (2012) is different. Barberis considers behavior when gambling a 50-50 bet for up to five periods. This combination of symmetric gambles and finite (very short) time horizon ensures that the "casino dries out of skewness." That is, at some exogenous point in time, the casino does not allow for gambling strategies any more that result in attractive gambles. The set of possible gambling strategies becomes smaller, or coarser, over time.
With this in mind it is immediate that typically we also have never stopping for a finite time space. To this means, the casino (or the financial market) must be able to offer a sufficiently skewed gamble (which is attractive according to either Theorem 1 or 2) in a single period, i.e., in the final period. This is just a less subtle way (compared to allowing for an infinite time horizon) to enrich the strategy space. To illustrate this point we give a numerical example in Appendix B. There we assume the original finite, discrete time setting introduced by Barberis (2012) , and simply change the probability of an up-movement in the binomial tree from 1/2 to 1/37. We show that an agent with CPT preferences as in Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and the parameter estimates from that paper never stops gambling for any finite or infinite horizon. If a casino cannot offer one-shot gambles with sufficient skewness, then several periods of gambling might be necessary to generate an attractive gamble. The number of periods will depend on both the maximal skewness of available one-shot gambles, and on the particular CPT specification and parameter choices. In such a situation, we will have an endgame effect as in Barberis (2012) . The analysis of this effect is extremely insightful to understand the interaction of probability weighting, time-inconsistency, and naïveté. Moreover, this setting yields reasonable predictions for the gambling behavior observed for at least some people. Our result shows that these predictions hinge upon the restricted strategy and time space, and no longer hold for long enough time horizons or casinos that offer skewed gambles. In particular, endgame effects should not be present in financial markets that offer a variety of gambling strategies, i.e., investment opportunities. The commonly made assumption of complete markets (which says that securities with any payoff structure are available) yields our extreme prediction of "never stopping" for any time horizon. These thoughts point to a challenge for the application of prospect theory in dynamic models of gambling or investment. In infinite time horizon models, our result applies. In complete markets, our result applies. For incomplete markets with a finite time horizon, on the other hand, our result will apply "in the limit". In that case, it will be hard to disentangle whether any conclusions drawn stem from the particular gambles considered, from the particular prospect theory preference specification-or from other features of the model one might actually be interested in. In particular, it seems undesirable that the number of periods (that must be exogenously specified ex ante) is crucial because they influence the richness of gambling strategies.
CONCLUSION
We set up a very general version of cumulative prospect theory (CPT) and point out fundamental implications for that theory that stem from probability weighting alone. The reference point is immaterial to our results and, in particular, may change over time. Only a few natural assumptions are made on the weighting and value functions. We first prove that probability weighting implies skewness preference in the small. At any wealth level, a CPT agent wants to take a sufficiently right-skewed binary risk that is arbitrarily small, even if it has negative expectation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first rigorous result that relates CPT to skewness preference. A corollary is that CPT agents are not risk-averse, even if, for example, the value function is concave everywhere. While we prove the existence of small attractive risks, under additional assumptions on the value function we show that attractive risks may, in fact, be quite large. For the power value function of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) we show that there exist attractive risks of arbitrary size. These static results have consequences for CPT in a dynamic context. We investigate the predictions of probability weighting for a naïve agent who is unaware of his time-inconsistency, which is induced by probability weighting. For a very large class of gambles, naïve CPT agents will never stop gambling. The implications of this result are far-reaching and very extreme. Naïve agents will gamble in a casino until the bitter end, i.e., they will go bankrupt almost surely. They will never exercise an American option, even if it is profitable to do so right from the beginning. And CPT does not predict the disposition effect for naïve agents. These results are formulated for a continuous, infinite time horizon. Then we illustrate that the results generally extend to discrete and finite time. This requires attractive (sufficiently skewed) gambles to be available at any point in time. It should be noted that casinos and even more financial markets allow for a very rich set of gambling and investment strategies. In complete markets, in particular, our never stopping result always applies. In finite time with a coarse strategy set, there will be an endgame effect. In that case, the set of available stopping strategies becomes smaller as time proceeds, which leads to interesting observations on the planned and actual behavior of naive agents. Generally, however, it is hard to disentangle whether the conclusions stem from an endgame effect or from fundamental features of the model one is actually interested in. This may be a severe drawback for the application of CPT in finite time horizon models of naïve behavior. While some researchers may regard our results as being negative on prospect theory (and on probability weighting in particular), another view may be to question the assumption of naïveté. In other words, our paper motivates the development of a more sophisticated model of dynamic prospect theory that yields, in general, reasonable predictions for gambling and investment behavior. For example, naïveté may become less pronounced as the agent is learning from his gambling experiences. Likewise, the impact of naïveté may be less extreme when the agent's possibilities to change her gambling strategy are restricted, e.g., because of reaction time or transaction costs. Such institutions work at discretizing the strategy set and may provoke an endgame effect that yields more desirable predictions as in Barberis (2012) . The current paper sheds light on these issues and may be helpful in developing a successful version of dynamic prospect theory with time-inconsistent agents. Here we show that all commonly used weighting functions exhibit likelihood insensitivity according to our Assumption 2. Most results are not new, but we think that the following collection is convenient, and we are not aware of a source that can be cited. The weighting function of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) given by
is differentiable on (0, 1), and the derivative is given by
For δ ≥ 0.28 the function is strictly increasing. For δ > 1 the function is S-shaped while for δ = 1 we have w(p) = p. The interesting parameter range thus is δ ∈ (0, 1) for which w is increasing and likelihood insensitive. For δ ∈ (0, 1) it is easy to see that
The weighting function of Prelec (1998) is given by
with both a and b strictly positive. According to Wakker (2010) 
We show that w is likelihood insensitive if a < 1. Similar arguments imply an S-shape of w if a > 1. For a = 1 the function has power form and is thus either convex (b > 1), linear, (b = 1), or concave b < 1, and also not sufficing Assumption 2. The derivative of the general version, given by equation (5), is given by
It is straightforward that lim pր1 w ′ (p) = +∞ for a < 1. To compute lim pց0 w ′ (p), substitute x = − log(p), and observe that
Note that The weighting function of Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) is defined by
for a > 0 and b > 0. According to Wakker (2010) , p. 208, "The choices a = 0.69 and b = 0.77 fit commonly found data well." These parameter choices imply a mild inverse-S-shape. The interesting parameter range for both a and b is (0, 2). a = 1 and b = 0.77 imply linearity. For b = 0.77 fixed, a > 1 implies S-shape, and for a < 1 the function is inverse-S-shaped, with likelihood insensitivity decreasing (i.e., stronger inverse-S-shape) for a ց 0. The derivative is
The following holds for arbitrary b > 0. For 0 < a < 1 we have 
That is, this function is (in general) discontinuous in 0 and 1 and linear on the interior of its domain. Therefore, it is likelihood insensitive according to our Assumption 2 except for b = 0 and a = 1. Finally, let us consider the weighting function proposed by Rieger and Wang (2006) which can be calibrated such that Assumption 2 is not fulfilled. For a, b ∈ (0, 1) it is given by
with derivatives at 0 and 1
Moreover, it is easy to show that It then easily follows that w ′ (0) and w ′ (1) may take any value in (0, 4). The smaller b, the more pronounced is the inverse-S shape of w and also the steeper are the functions at 0, 1. By construction, w(a) = a, and the derivative at 0 (1) is increasing (decreasing) in a. Thus a allows to account for different overweighting of good-and bad-outcome probabilities. Generally, the higher b the more likely our Assumption 2 is fulfilled. Also note that for low values of b CPT cannot explain the coexistence of gambling and insurance (Pfiffelmann 2011) . Moreover, Azevedo and Gottlieb (2012) show that their unbounded profits paradox emerges for the Rieger-Wang weighting function in combination with both power and exponential utility.
A.2. Proof of Theorem 1
We split the proof into three cases x > r, x < r, and x = r. We prove the equivalent result that for all x ∈ R and every ǫ > 0 there exists a binary lottery L ≡ L (p, b, a) with mean x and a, b
Proof of case 1 (x > r). Choose a > r such that both a and b are gains. Then lottery L gives the agent a utility of CP T (L) = w + (p)U (b) + (1 − w + (p))U (a). Therefore, the agent prefers L over x if there exist a < x and b > x such that
Consider sequences (a n , b n ) n∈N , with a n = x − p n and b n = x + 1−p n . Note that by construction
Therefore, according to equation (6), the agent prefers lottery L over x if
First, suppose that
Because the subtracted part in equation (7) is bounded for every n, equation (7) is fulfilled for sufficiently small p. Moreover, since (a n ) ր x and (b n ) ց x we have a n , b n ∈ (x − ǫ, x + ǫ) for n sufficiently large. Second, suppose lim p→0
Since ξ(p) is continuous (Assumption 1) there existsp ∈ (0, 1) such that also ξ(p) > 0, i.e., lim n→∞ ξ n (p) > 0. Therefore, equation (7), and also a n , b n ∈ (x − ǫ, x + ǫ), is fulfilled for n = n(p, ǫ) sufficiently large, i.e., L (p, b n(p,ǫ) (p), a n(p,ǫ) (p)) is preferred over x for sure. Proof of case 2 (x < r). Choose b < r such that both a and b are losses. In that case, lottery L = L (p, b, a) secures the agent a utility of A.8. Proof of Theorem 3.
Suppose the agent arrives at wealth x at time t, i.e., X t = x. The agent can stop and get a utility of CP T (x), or she may continue gambling. She continues to gamble if there exists a gambling strategy τ ∈ S, i.e., a stopping time such that CP T (x) < CP T (X τ ). We consider strategies τ a,b with two absorbing endpoints a < x < b which stop if the process (X t ) t∈R+ leaves the interval (a, b) , i.e.,
Denote with p = P(X τ a,b = b) the probability that with strategy τ a,b the agent will stop at b. Note that strategy τ a,b results in a binary lottery for the agent. We first prove that the agent never stops if (X t ) t∈R+ is a martingale. For every stopping time τ a,b consider the sequence of bounded stopping times min{τ a,b , n} for n ∈ N. By Doobs optional stopping theorem (Revuz and Yor 1999, p. 70) , E(X min{τ a,b ,n} ) = X t = x. By the theorem of dominated convergence it follows that
Hence, X τ a,b implements the binary lottery L(p, a, b) with expectation x. From Theorem 1 (Theorem 2) it follows that there exist a, b ∈ I such that the agent prefers the binary lottery induced by the strategy τ a,b over the certain outcome x.
In the last step we prove that the naïve agent never stops even if (X t ) t∈R+ is not a martingale. Define the strictly increasing scale function S : R → R by
Define a new processX t = S(X t ) and a new value functionÛ (x) = (U • S −1 )(x). Note that the loss aversion index of the value functionÛ equals the loss aversion index of U because
A CPT agent with the value functionÛ facing the process (X t ) t∈R+ evaluates all stopping times exactly as a CPT agent with value function U who faces (X t ) t∈R+ . The processX t = S(X t ) satisfies (Revuz and Yor (1999 1999, p . 303 ff))
and hence it follows from the argument for martingales that the agent never stops.
APPENDIX B: EXAMPLE FOR NEVER STOPPING IN DISCRETE AND FINITE TIME
Consider the five-period binomial decision tree of Barberis (2012) . Assume a casino that offers a fair version of French Roulette. We assume a fair casino to be close to the model of Barberis (2012) . Then the basic gamble considered by Barberis is the fair analogue to a bet on Red or Black, which occur with equal probability. Now suppose the agent can also bet on a single number, which occurs with probability 1 37 . Consider an agent who only considers to bet 10 units of money on a single number. He is not even able to form a gambling strategy over several periods. This implies a rather coarse strategy space, a feature which is actually working against our never stopping result. However, the basic gamble is skewed whereas the basic gamble in Barberis (2012) is symmetric. Let (X t ) t∈R+ be the binomial random walk that represents This figure shows the excess utility an agent gains from gambling (over not gambling) for different wealth levels. The left panel shows the utility from gambling a fair 50-50 bet, while the right panel shows the utility from gambling a fair 1 to 37 bet. The agent is a CPT maximizer with the parametrization of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) with parameters given by α = 0.88, δ = 0.65, and λ = 2.25. The agent's reference point is 0. his wealth. It increases by 360 with probability 1 37 and decreases by 10 with probability 36 37 , starting at some level X 0 ∈ R, i.e., P(X t+1 = X t + 360) = 1 37 and P(X t+1 = X t − 10) = 36 37 . The agent is forced to stop in the final period T, which is exogenous, or if the random walk reaches zero. Suppose the agent has CPT preferences given by the original parametrization of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) with parameters as estimated by the authors. Figure 1 plots the excess utility from gambling for the two basic gambles described above. For the 50-50 gamble (left panel), gambling is attractive over the area of losses, and unattractive at the reference point and thereafter. This fits with the common intuition of risk seeking over losses and risk aversion over gains, which is induced by the S-shaped value function. Note that the probability weighting component has no grip when evaluating 50-50 gambles. However, the right panel shows that gambling the skewed basic gamble is attractive everywhere. The lowest utility from gambling is at the reference point, but this utility is still positive (the exact value is +0.56). Therefore, at any node of the binomial tree, the agent will want to gamble. That is, the agent never stops even though we have finite time with an arbitrary number of gambling periods and a rather limited strategy space. Only one basic gamble is available, but this gamble is sufficiently skewed to be attractive to this very CPT agent. A stop-loss plan would grant even higher utility to the agent, but the one-shot gamble is attractive in itself already.
APPENDIX C: DISCOUNTING FOR GEOMETRIC BROWNIAN MOTION
In this section we investigate the robustness of our results to discounting and provide formal results for the important case of geometric Brownian motion. Geometric Brownian motion is often used to model the price development of an asset. Thus it is interesting to consider the discounted process (Z t ) t∈R+ = (e −αt X t ) t∈R+ where α denotes the opportunity costs of investment, for example the risk-free rate. Recall that the geometric Brownian motion (X t ) t∈R+ with drift µ and volatility σ solves dX t = X t (µdt + σdW t ) .
For the geometric Brownian motion it is a well known result that (Z t ) t∈R+ solves dZ t = Z t ([µ − r]dt + σdW t ) , which is again a Markov diffusion (a geometric Brownian motion with a different drift). Thus also the discounted process (Z t ) t∈R+ is covered by our setup and the never stopping result, Theorem 3, applies. For processes (X t ) t∈R+ other than geometric Brownian motion it may also be true that (Z t ) t∈R+ = (e −αt X t ) t∈R+ is a Markov diffusion, but proofs may be less tractable. Another approach to incorporate discounting would be to generalize Theorem 3 to more general stochastic processes, which may likewise be possible under some technical conditions.
